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1 
THE DEATH OF THE COMMON LAW: JUDICIAL 
ABDICATION AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IN 
MARYLAND 
DONALD G. GIFFORD* 
INTRODUCTION 
A generation ago, singer-songwriter Don McLean sang of “The 
Day the Music Died.”1  This summer, for many victims of negligently 
inflicted injuries, July 9, 2013, marked the day that the common law 
process in Maryland died.  In Coleman v. Soccer Association of Columbia,2 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland denied recovery to a twenty-year old 
volunteer soccer coach who sustained multiple, severe facial fractures 
when, in a moment of youthful exuberance, he jumped up and 
grabbed the crossbar of a soccer goal as so many before him have 
done.  The jury found the defendant was negligent in failing to 
properly inspect the goal, but it also found that the plaintiff was 
contributorily negligent.  The Court of Appeals applied the ancient 
doctrine of contributory negligence, a rule followed by only three 
other states and the District of Columbia,3 to totally bar the plaintiff’s 
recovery.  In this article, I examine the Court of Appeals’ rationale for 
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School of Law; J.D., Harvard, 1976.  I greatly appreciate the very helpful comments from 
Chris Robinette of the Widener University School of Law, who has previously written about 
the consequences of a change from contributory negligence to comparative fault, see 
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Bill Reynolds and Richard Boldt.  I also thank Laura Koman and Jane Kalinina for their 
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 1.  DON MCLEAN, American Pie, on AMERICAN PIE (United Artists Records 1971) 
(referring to the 1959 plane crash that killed early rock legends Buddy Holly, Ritchie 
Valens and The Big Bopper (Jiles Perry Richardson, Jr.)).  
 2.  Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Columbia, No. 9, 2013 Md. LEXIS 460 (Md. July 9, 
2013). 
 3.  Id. at *36 n.3 (Harrell, J., dissenting). 
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its decision in Coleman and contend that the court failed to fulfill its 
obligations as Maryland’s highest common law court. 
It may be worth noting that before entering legal education, I 
represented both plaintiffs and defendants in personal injury actions.  
Since becoming a law professor in 1979, however, I have worked only 
on behalf of defendants in my limited consulting activities.  In short, 
it is not just plaintiffs’ attorneys who believe that Coleman is wrongly 
decided and poorly reasoned. 
I.  A SMIDGEN OF TORT LAW: THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE 
A.  Coleman v. Soccer Association of Columbia: The Case 
When the Court of Appeals of Maryland agreed to hear Coleman,4 
many lawyers and judges believed the court would at long last leave 
the tiny group of jurisdictions that continue to hold that contributory 
negligence constitutes a total bar to recovery.  Chief Judge Robert 
Bell was retiring, and it was well known that he favored the adoption 
of comparative fault.5  To many, the facts in Coleman were “plaintiff-
friendly,” suggesting that the court had accepted certiorari in this 
particular case in order to add another important accomplishment to 
Chief Judge Bell’s already impressive legacy.  A year later, we know 
better.  Chief Judge Bell was one of only two judges on the court to 
dissent to the outcome in Coleman.6  More importantly, despite the 
fact that a jury found that the Soccer Association of Columbia was 
negligent and that its negligence was a necessary, proximate cause of 
the plaintiff’s injuries, James Kyle Coleman’s resort to the common 
law was unsuccessful. 
During a practice session with the team of young players he 
helped coach, Coleman kicked the ball into the goal and, as he 
retrieved the ball, he instinctively celebrated by jumping up and 
grabbing the crossbar of the goal.7  The goal, unfortunately, was not 
anchored to the ground.  Coleman fell backwards, causing the 
crossbar to crash onto his face, resulting in “multiple severe facial 
fractures which required surgery and the placing of three titanium 
                                                        
 4.  Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Columbia, 425 Md. 396, 41 A.3d 570 (2012) (order 
granting cert.), opinion after grant of cert., No. 9, 2013 Md. LEXIS 460, (Md. July 9, 2013). 
 5.  Ann E. Marimow, Maryland’s High Court Considers Rewriting Rules for Assessing Fault, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-09-
10/local/35495479_1_soccer-association-soccer-club-court-system.  
 6.  Coleman, 2013 Md. LEXIS 460, at *29 (Harrell, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Robert 
Bell joined Justice Harrell in his dissent. Id. at *112. 
 7.  Id. at *2–3 (majority opinion). 
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plates in his face.”8  Coleman sued the Soccer Association.  At trial, 
the coach who invited Coleman to assist him testified that he had not 
inspected the goal where the accident occurred in order to assure 
that it was properly anchored.  Other witnesses testified that it was 
common for those participating in soccer to hang from the crossbar 
of the goal.  The jury found the association negligent, but it also 
found that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent.  The trial court 
judge quite properly applied Maryland law as it existed and denied 
Coleman any recovery.  Before the case could be briefed and argued 
in the intermediate appellate court, the Court of Special Appeals, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland accepted certiorari to consider the sole 
issue of whether contributory negligence should continue to be a 
total bar to recovery.  In Coleman, the court held that “we decline to 
abrogate Maryland’s long-established common law principle of 
contributory negligence.”9 
B.  The Role of Plaintiff’s Fault in Negligence Cases 
The Coleman decision leaves Maryland as one of only five states 
that have not eliminated contributory negligence as a total bar to 
recovery and replaced it with comparative fault.10  Most states adopted 
comparative fault during the period extending from the late 1960s 
through the early 1980s, and it appears to be working.  No state that 
adopted comparative fault has gone back to a contributory negligence 
regime.  Each year businesses and insurance companies in the forty-
six comparative fault jurisdictions propose a variety of “tort reform” 
measures, just as they do in Maryland.  A return to contributory 
negligence is rarely, if ever, included in the “wish list” of these 
businesses and insurance companies. In virtually all states, including 
many with the most thriving economies, the change from 
contributory negligence to comparative fault is accepted, ancient 
history. Not in Maryland. 
Under Maryland’s doctrine of contributory negligence, even if 
the jury believes that the defendant’s negligence is far more culpable 
(or contributed far more to the injury) than the victim’s own 
contributory negligence, that is, the plaintiff’s failure to use 
reasonable care to protect herself or himself, the plaintiff still 
                                                        
 8.  Id. at *3. 
 9.  Id. at *7. 
 10.  Id. at *36 n.3 (Harrell, J., dissenting).  The other jurisdictions that still apply 
contributory negligence as a total bar to recovery include Alabama, North Carolina, 
Virginia, and the District of Columbia.  Id.  
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recovers nothing.  The alternative to contributory negligence as a 
total bar to recovery is known as comparative fault.  There are two 
basic forms of comparative fault: “pure” and “modified.”  Under the 
pure form of comparative fault, the jury is asked to compare the 
defendant’s negligence that was a necessary cause of the plaintiff’s 
injuries with the plaintiff’s own contributory negligence and  quantify 
the comparison by attributing a percentage of fault to each party.  
The plaintiff is then able to recover the total amount of the damages 
as determined by the jury, multiplied by the defendant’s degree of 
fault.  For example, if the jury finds that the plaintiff is ten percent at 
fault and the defendant is ninety percent at fault, the plaintiff receives 
ninety percent of the total damages instead of nothing, which would 
be the outcome under a contributory negligence rule. 
Most courts adopting comparative fault endorse the variant 
known as pure comparative fault that operates as described above.11  
More often than not, however, it is the legislature that adopts 
comparative fault, and all, or virtually all legislatures, have adopted a 
“modified” comparative fault system.  Under modified comparative 
fault a plaintiff who is more at fault (most modified comparative fault 
jurisdictions) or equally at fault (a small minority of such 
jurisdictions) as the defendant, recovers nothing. Otherwise, as in a 
pure comparative fault state, the plaintiff’s recovery is reduced by the 
percentage of fault attributable to plaintiff. 
Proponents of the modified form of comparative fault argue it 
has two advantages.  First, it avoids the anomaly, troubling to some, of 
the more culpable plaintiff recovering from a less culpable defendant.  
Second, it reduces both the filing of actions—by discouraging 
plaintiff’s counsel from filing cases in which the plaintiff clearly is 
more at fault—and the number of cases remaining to be heard by the 
jury after judicial dismissals of cases in which the plaintiff clearly is 
more at fault than the defendant. 
In and of itself, the widespread judicial and legislative adoption 
of comparative fault suggests a discordant anomaly.  How is it that 
Maryland, usually perceived to be one of the nation’s most 
progressive states, is one of only four states that retains a doctrine 
regarded as very traditional, conservative, anti-consumer, and even 
antiquated? 
                                                        
 11.  When the legislature either initially adopts comparative fault or steps in after the 
court initially adopts comparative fault, it usually enacts a system of modified comparative 
fault.  VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 64, 81 (5th ed. 2010).  
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II.  THE COURT ON ITS OWN TERMS: JUSTIFYING JUDICIAL ABDICATION 
The majority and concurring opinions in Coleman are curious in 
any number of regards.  Nowhere do they present a substantive 
argument that the continued application of contributory negligence 
yields more just or fairer judicial decisions than would a change to 
comparative fault.  Judge Eldridge’s majority opinion made absolutely 
no attempt to rebut the arguments that he explicitly acknowledged 
exist in favor of abrogating contributory negligence: 
They argue contributory negligence is an antiquated 
doctrine, that it has been roundly criticized by academic 
legal scholars, and that it has been rejected in a majority of 
our sister states.  It is also pointed out that contributory 
negligence works an inherent unfairness by barring plaintiffs 
from any recovery, even when it is proven in a particular case 
that a defendant’s negligence was primarily responsible for 
the act or omission which resulted in a plaintiff’s injuries.  It 
is said that contributory negligence provides harsh justice to 
those who may have acted negligently, in minor ways, to 
contribute to their injuries, and that it absolves those 
defendants from liability who can find any minor negligence 
in the plaintiffs’ behavior.12 
Even more blatantly, Judge Greene, concurring in an opinion 
joined by three of his colleagues (thus constituting a majority of the 
seven-member court), wrote, “I am willing to concede that a system 
premised on comparative negligence for apportioning fault appears 
to be a more equitable system of determining liability and a more 
socially desirable method of loss distribution.”13 
Further, the court explicitly accepted the idea that the original 
purpose of the creation of contributory negligence during the first 
half of the nineteenth century in Maryland and elsewhere was to 
protect emerging industries and railroads, a new form of 
transportation, from juries that “had the potential to stifle newly 
developing industry”14 and “wreak financial disaster” upon the 
“burgeoning” railroad industry.15  Obviously, these justifications no 
longer apply in the twenty-first century. 
                                                        
 12.  Coleman, 2013 Md. LEXIS 460, at *17–18. 
 13.  Id. at *27 (Green, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 14.  Id. at *9 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 15.  Id. at *9 n.5 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Perhaps most important, the court stated that it “has the 
authority to change the common law rule of contributory 
negligence.”16  Judge Greene added, “[T]here is no dispute about 
whether this Court has the authority to change the common law.”17  
The majority noted that the principle of stare decisis: 
[S]hould not be construed to inhibit [this Court] from 
changing or modifying a common law rule by judicial 
decision where we find, in light of changed conditions or 
increased knowledge, that the rule has become unsound in 
the circumstances of modern life, a vestige of the past, no 
longer suitable to our people.18 
The majority opinion continued: “This Court has repeatedly said 
that the common law is not static; its life and heart is its dynamism—
its ability to keep pace with the world while constantly searching for 
just and fair solutions to pressing societal problems.”19  Further, the 
court acknowledged that “because contributory negligence is a court-
created principle, and has not been embodied in Maryland statutes, 
this Court possesses the authority to change the principle.”20 
Then the court punted, abdicating its judicial duty in the 
process.  To recap the reasoning of the judges, the majority opinion 
implicitly suggested that it recognizes that contributory negligence is 
an unfair, antiquated policy with its roots and justifications lying in a 
long-past era that no longer applies.  The concurring opinion openly 
stated that the rule is neither “equitable” nor “socially desirable.”21  
The judges recognized that it is within their authority as common law 
judges to adopt comparative fault.  The court, however, ultimately 
decided to apply the law of contributory negligence in the case before 
it and to future cases. 
Why?  The majority stated that “[t]he General Assembly’s 
repeated failure to pass legislation abrogating the defense of 
contributory negligence is very strong evidence that the legislative 
policy in Maryland is to retain the principle of contributory 
negligence.”22 
                                                        
 16.  Id. at *7.  
 17.  Id. at *25 (Greene, J., concurring). 
 18.  Id. at *14 (majority opinion) (quoting Harrison v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 
295 Md. 442, 459, 456 A.2d 894, 903 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 19.  Id. at *19 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 20.  Id. at *18. 
 21.  Id. at *27 (Greene, J., concurring). 
 22.  Id. at *23–24.   
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Judge Greene also expressed concerns about the details of the 
implementation and the collateral consequences of the adoption of 
comparative fault—such as whether to adopt pure or modified 
comparative fault; how it would apply in the case of multiple 
tortfeasors; and whether its adoption would affect joint and several 
liability, contribution, assumption of risk, and last clear chance.23  
Somehow other state supreme courts, while identifying the same 
issues, have concluded that the courts are able to work out such issues 
as the years go by.24  A generation after adopting the principle of 
comparative fault, the judicial systems of these states have operated 
smoothly, without descending into chaos or confusion.  Perhaps the 
members of the court are not aware that these specific issues are 
among those typically addressed today in first-semester Torts classes.  
Of course, the legislature may want to get involved in the specifics of 
implementation if it thinks the courts are getting things wrong, but 
this does not excuse the court from walking away from the important 
transcendent issue of whether or not contributory negligence should 
be replaced with comparative fault. 
A contrary result in Coleman would not have required the court 
to, at this time, address the issues about which Judge Greene is 
concerned—issues not presented by the case.  As the Florida Supreme 
Court stated when it adopted comparative fault forty years ago in 
Hoffman v. Jones, “[I]t is not the proper function of this Court to 
decide unripe issues, without the benefit of adequate briefing, not 
involving an actual controversy, and unrelated to a specific factual 
situation.”25  When such issues are in fact posed to the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland, the court would be able to draw upon decades 
of experience from the courts and legislatures in forty-six other states.  
The wheel would not need to be reinvented. 
I recognize that my critique of the court’s reasoning in this 
article may sound harsh.  In the opinion, the majority seems to be 
trying to inoculate itself from the attack it anticipates from “academic 
legal scholars,”26 a phrase so linguistically redundant as to echo the 
                                                        
 23.  Id. at *38–39 (Harrell, J., dissenting).  
 24. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1241 (Cal. 1975) (stating that these 
issues have “not diminished our conviction that the time for a revision of the means for 
dealing with contributory fault in this state is long past due and that it lies within the 
province of this court to initiate the needed change by our decision in this case”); 
Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431, 439–40 (Fla. 1973) (“We feel the trial judges of this State 
are capable of applying this comparative negligence rule without our setting guidelines in 
anticipation of expected problems.”).  
 25.  280 So.2d at 438.  
 26.  Coleman, 2013 Md. LEXIS 460, at *17. 
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scathing populists of an earlier generation.  To place the tone of my 
own critique in the context of “real world” standards, I quote the 
entire first paragraph of the dissenting opinion of Judge Harrell, who 
before now has never been considered an out-of-touch academic 
radical: 
 Paleontologists and geologists inform us that Earth’s 
Cretaceous period (including in what is present day 
Maryland) ended approximately 65 million years ago with an 
asteroid striking Earth (the Cretaceous-Paleogene 
Extinction Event), wiping-out, in a relatively short period of 
geologic time, most plant and animal species, including 
dinosaurs. As to the last premise, they are wrong.  A 
dinosaur roams yet the landscape of Maryland (and Virginia, 
Alabama, North Carolina and the District of Columbia), 
feeding on the claims of persons injured by the negligence 
of another, but who contributed proximately in some way to 
the occasion of his or her injuries, however slight their 
culpability.  The name of that dinosaur is the doctrine of 
contributory negligence. With the force of a modern 
asteroid strike, this Court should render, in the present case, 
this dinosaur extinct. It chooses not to do so.  Accordingly, I 
dissent.27 
III.  THE ROLE OF THE STATE’S HIGHEST COMMON LAW COURT 
A.  The Obligations of a Common Law Court 
The basic law of torts—governing, among other things, whether 
or not the victim of a personal injury is able to recover from the party 
who caused the injury—is, except when the legislature acts 
affirmatively, determined by judge-made or common law.  In this 
regard, American law differs from that of most other countries, such 
as China, France, or Russia, where the law governing personal injury 
claims is statutory, enacted by the legislature, albeit often in very 
broadly-articulated terms. 
The legitimacy of the common law differs from that which gives 
authority to statutes enacted by legislatures, and regulations and 
rulings of administrative agencies.  Judicial rulings are not meant to 
be a reflection of the will of the electorate.  Instead, the legitimacy of 
judicial lawmaking rests on the idea that judges begin their reasoning 
                                                        
 27.  Id. at *29–30 (Harrell, J., dissenting).  
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process with a presumption that they will follow precedents in earlier 
cases on similar facts.  Even in the 1890s, however, at a time when the 
law of negligence dominated the legal landscape, Judge Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr., later a Supreme Court Justice and regarded as 
perhaps the key figure in defining the traditional law of negligence, 
wrote the following: 
 It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law 
than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.  It is 
still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid 
down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists 
from blind imitation of the past.28 
Few American judges, lawyers, and legal scholars in the late-
twentieth and twenty-first centuries subscribe to the views of legal 
formalism or “mechanical jurisprudence” that often prevailed during 
the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries when the common 
law was sometimes conceived of as nothing more than rules deduced 
from precedents applied syllogistically to the facts of the present case.  
For example, as early as 1936, United States Supreme Court Justice 
Harlan F. Stone stated, “[T]he law itself is something better than its 
bad precedents . . . the bad precedent must on occasion yield to the 
better reason.”29  He specifically suggested that courts are justified in 
overruling precedents because “[s]cience, invention and industrial 
expansion have done more than all else to change the habits of the 
life of the people . . . since the Civil War . . . than occurred in the 
three centuries which followed the discovery of America.”30  Judge 
Learned Hand, a conservative and one of the most respected judges 
of the mid-twentieth century, similarly concluded that while a judge 
“must preserve his authority by cloaking himself in the majesty of an 
overshadowing past . . . he must discover some composition with the 
dominant trends of his time.”31  Even Sir Edward Coke, perhaps the 
most important writer on the topic of the common law as it developed 
in England, wrote as early as the sixteenth century that precedents 
should be overruled when the results of such precedents result in 
“inconvenience.”32 
The common law evolves as societal norms, as well as changes in 
relevant aspects of society—such as, in the case of negligence law, the 
types and sources of tortious harms—-change.  Precedents establish 
                                                        
 28.  Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).  
 29.  Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (1936).  
 30.  Id. at 11.  
 31.  Learned Hand, Mr. Justice Cardozo, 52 HARV. L. REV. 361, 361 (1939).  
 32.  Stone, supra note 29, at 8.  
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the beginning point of the common law process, but only the 
beginning point.  The Court of Appeals of Maryland repeatedly has 
acknowledged this through the decades as it has altered the 
precedents that previously governed recovery (or, more typically, 
prevented recovery) for tortious injury.33  In the past, the court 
explicitly stated, “Because of the inherent dynamism of the common 
law, we have consistently held that it is subject to judicial modification 
in the light of modern circumstances or increased knowledge.”34  The 
court also explicitly has cited “the guidance of a significant majority of 
other states”35 as a justification for overturning precedents. 
Along with the Court of Appeals’ authority to establish the 
common law and to change it when circumstances warrant 
modification comes judicial obligation.  When a litigant presents a 
court with a claim of right, the court is obligated to rule on the claim 
assuming that the court has jurisdiction over it.  In this regard, the 
court is fundamentally different from a legislature, which establishes 
new law only when it wants to do so and can always decide not to 
address an issue.  A court, however, cannot decide that an issue is too 
difficult or too controversial upon which to rule.  It must decide the 
litigant’s claim.  Even if the court writes, as it did in Coleman, that it is 
up to the legislature to make any change in the law, in doing so the 
court reaffirms that the law status quo ante governs both the case 
before it and others in the future.  A common law court cannot pass 
the buck.  Indeed, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has repeatedly 
stated that “it is our duty to determine the common law as it exists in 
this State.”36 
The role of the court in establishing the law in a field such as 
torts where the common law predominates is very, very different from 
the role of the court in evaluating a claim alleging that a statute or 
executive action is unconstitutional.  In the latter instance, except 
where the claim involves either a suspect class or a fundamental right, 
the proper role of the court is to defer to the legislature unless there 
is no rational justification for the statutory enactment or executive 
                                                        
 33.  Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77 (1978) (abolishing the defense of 
interspousal immunity in the case of outrageous intentional torts); Phipps v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976) (adopting strict liability as expressed in § 402A of 
the Restatement (2d) of Torts); Mackubin v Curtiss-Wright Corp., 190 Md. 52, 57 A.2d 318 
(1948) (belatedly relaxing the privity requirement in third-party beneficiary cases). 
 34.  Ireland v. State, 310 Md. 328, 331, 529 A.2d 365, 366 (1987).  
 35.  B&K Rentals and Sales Co., Inc. v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 324 Md. 147, 158, 
596 A.2d 640, 645 (1991).  
 36.  E.g., Ass’n of Indep. Taxi Operators v. Yellow Cab Co., 198 Md. 181, 204, 82 A.2d 
106, 117 (1951) (emphasis added).  
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action.37  In short, in cases raising constitutional challenges, the 
legislature or the executive has the primary responsibility for 
declaring what the law is; and the court acts only in highly unusual 
circumstances.  When it comes to the common law, however, the 
courts have the responsibility—indeed, the obligation, the duty—to 
establish the law unless and until the legislature acts. 
B.  The Court’s Interpretation of Legislative Inaction 
The Court of Appeals correctly noted in Coleman that the 
legislature can change the common law of contributory negligence if 
it were inclined to do so.  The Maryland legislature, however, has 
never codified the judge-made law of contributory negligence.  The 
petitioners in Coleman were not asking the court to declare 
unconstitutional a statute establishing contributory negligence as a 
total bar to recovery, but rather asking the court to fulfill its 
responsibility to declare the common law, taking into account 
changed conditions.  There simply is no legislative policy or public 
policy declared by the legislature in the State of Maryland to which 
the court has any reason to defer. 
The Maryland General Assembly has considered legislative 
proposals to adopt comparative fault on a number of occasions in 
recent years.  Their proposals have failed to receive an affirmative 
recommendation from either or both the judiciary committees of the 
two houses of the legislature.38  In Coleman, the court erroneously 
concluded that the legislature’s failure to legislatively impose 
comparative fault establishes that contributory negligence reflects the 
“legislative policy” and or the “public policy” of the state.  However, it 
is widely accepted that the legislature’s failure to act does not 
necessarily indicate its opposition to a proposed piece of legislation.39  
As leading constitutional law scholar Laurence Tribe wrote, 
When the array of powers held by the executive, the 
judiciary, or the states with respect to a given matter can be 
transformed only by congressional approval or disapproval, 
                                                        
 37.  See, e.g., DRD Pool Serv. v. Freed, 416 Md. 46, 67, 5 A.3d 45, 57 (2010) (explaining 
that “the rational basis test is highly deferential” and “presumes a statute is constitutional 
and should be struck down only if the reviewing court concludes that the Legislature 
enacted the statute irrationally or interferes with a fundamental right”).   
 38.  Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Columbia, No. 9, 2013 Md. LEXIS 460, at *21 n.6 (Md. 
July 9, 2013) (listing several unfavorable House and Committee reports on legislative 
proposals to adopt comparative fault legislation).  
 39.  See, e.g., HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1358–60 (William N. Eskridge & 
Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). 
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then it is essential that such approval or disapproval take the 
form of legislation made through [the formal constitutional 
procedures for passing laws].40 
In Goldstein v. State,41 the Court of Appeals of Maryland itself took 
the same approach: 
 Maryland generally adheres to the majority view on 
legislative inaction, which is that ordinarily the fact that a bill 
on a specific subject fails of passage in the General Assembly 
is a rather weak reed upon which to lean in ascertaining 
legislative intent.  Thus, the mere fact that the General 
Assembly has declined to adopt a particular proposal does 
not preclude this Court from incorporating the substance of 
that proposal into the common law . . . . []Courts have 
traditionally been reluctant to infer legislative intent from 
legislative inaction when there are several possible reasons 
for defeat.42 
In Coleman, the court made no attempt to distinguish Goldstein. 
 It is far easier to kill a legislative proposal than it is to enact one.  
Literally from the founding of our Republic,43 Congress and state 
legislatures have operated with “veto gates” or “negative legislative 
checkpoints”44 designed to protect minorities—most often, in the 
early decades of the United States, propertied interests—from the 
tyranny of the majority.45  As my colleague Professor Maxwell Stearns 
observed, “The very mechanisms designed to protect against majority 
tyranny by making legislation more difficult to procure serve as 
venues for special interest influence.”46 
Enacting comparative fault legislation requires the Maryland 
General Assembly to undertake a difficult process that usually 
requires action by two houses of the legislature, the signature of the 
governor, and the time and energy required to accomplish these steps 
during an often crowded and busy legislative session.  Adding to the 
legislature’s challenge is the fact that sometimes (even in Maryland at 
points during the past 170 years), the governor and the majority in 
each legislative chamber are not of the same political party.  Stearns 
                                                        
 40.   LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 204–05 (3d ed. 2000). 
 41.  339 Md. 563, 664 A.2d 375 (1995). 
 42.  Id. at 569–70, 644 A.2d at 378 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
 43.  See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).  
 44.  Maxwell L. Stearns, Direct (Anti-) Democracy, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 311, 316 (2012) 
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 45.  Id. at 315–17. 
 46.  Id. at 316. 
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observed that “[t]hese junctures make it easier to block than to pass 
legislation because success at every focal point is required for passage 
whereas failing at only one is sufficient for defeat.”47  Legislative 
inaction is not a declaration that the legislature approves the existing 
common law. 
During the mid-1990s, I attended committee hearings of the 
Maryland General Assembly considering replacing contributory 
negligence with comparative fault.  Legislators who voted against such 
reform legislation often explained their votes by saying that this is a 
matter for the courts to decide.  At least in the first instance, these 
legislators’ understanding of the role of common law courts was more 
accurate than that of the judges comprising the majority in Coleman! 
Further, if the court is deriving the legislative policy or public 
policy of the state from the General Assembly’s failure to enact 
proposed legislation adopting comparative fault, what significance 
should be given to the fact that the legislature also has repeatedly 
failed to codify the doctrine of contributory negligence?48  The court’s 
failure to even mention this legislative inaction is totally at odds with 
its conclusion that legislative inaction establishes the public policy of 
the state.  The court cannot have it both ways. 
Finally, what is the precedential value of the holding in Coleman?  
If the court’s opinion means that it will not change the common law 
when the legislature repeatedly has failed to do so, the implications 
are staggering. Each legislative session, the Maryland General 
Assembly considers many bills designed to change one specific aspect 
or another of the judge-made, common law of Maryland. Often such 
tort reform proposals are recycled year after year. If the Court of 
Appeals were to apply Coleman as precedent, it would refuse to 
consider the merits of litigants’ arguments whenever the legislature 
has repeatedly refused to change the law. Obviously, if that occurs, 
the common law of torts in Maryland is no longer on life support.  It 
is truly dead. 
What is worse is that Coleman results in a perverse incentive for 
special interest lobbyists to encourage members of the General 
Assembly to introduce legislation opposed to the interests of the 
lobbyists’ clients under circumstances in which passage of the 
legislation is highly unlikely in order to establish a record that the 
legislature has repeatedly failed to overturn the common law status 
quo ante.  If Coleman is to be treated as a precedent, a legislative 
                                                        
 47.  Id. at 336. 
 48.  See, e.g., H.B. 1156, 2013 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2013). 
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record finessed by special interest lobbyists would bar the Court of 
Appeals from changing the common law. 
C.  The Legislature as an Imperfect Democratic Institution 
Obviously, it is the legislature, not the courts, that should reflect 
the popular will of the electorate.  Remember again that I am not 
suggesting that an “elitist” court undo the popular will as expressed in 
a legislative enactment.  However, legislative action and, more 
pertinently for our purposes, legislative inaction, may not perfectly 
reflect the will of the electorate. 
It is inherent in the nature of tort litigation that legislative 
attempts to modify the common law of torts encounter an 
asymmetrical balance of lobbying interests.  Many Maryland 
businesses are continuously aware that they may become defendants 
in negligence actions, and liability insurance carriers always know that 
they will be financially responsible in many such actions.  Each year 
they spend millions of dollars hiring some of the very best lobbyists in 
Annapolis and making campaign contributions to legislators, 
particularly those in leadership positions and on judiciary committees 
with jurisdiction over the reform of tort law. 
In contrast, those random citizens who in the future may 
unpredictably end up as victims of negligence dramatically 
underestimate the probability that they will be harmed by the 
combination of the negligence of others and their own momentary 
inadvertence or carelessness.49  Further, the realistic likelihood that 
any particular Maryland resident will be an accident victim is quite 
small.  As a result, few future accident victims think about 
contributory negligence when they vote.  Fewer yet make campaign 
contributions based on their interests in this issue or lobby the state 
legislature for change. 
“Wait,” cry insurance defense lawyers and insurance and business 
lobbyists, “Plaintiffs’ personal injury attorneys are among the most 
potent lobbyists and most generous campaign contributors in the 
state legislative process.”  This may be true, but these representatives 
of plaintiffs’ personal injury attorneys are far from perfect proxies for 
the interests of future accident victims.  Why? 
First, and most important, we must consider the relationship 
between the legal doctrines of contributory negligence and joint and 
several liability and how it affects the balance of lobbying power on 
                                                        
 49.  Guido Calabresi & Kenneth C. Bass, III., Right Approach, Wrong Implications: A 
Critique of McKean on Products Liability, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 74, 88–89 (1970). 
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the issue of contributory negligence.  One of the traditional 
justifications for the doctrine of contributory negligence, albeit not 
one mentioned by the majority in Coleman, is that it is too difficult for 
ordinary citizens as jurors to calibrate the respective degrees of fault 
of the victim and the tortfeasor and express them in percentage terms 
as required by a comparative fault regime.  This same justification 
exists for the “all-or-nothing” approach of joint and several liability 
under which each individual tortfeasor is liable to the plaintiff for the 
entire harm to which it contributed.  The all-or-nothing approach of 
contributory negligence favors the defendant; the all-or-nothing 
approach of joint and several liability favors the plaintiff.  Of course, 
under the current regime of joint and several liability, if one 
defendant pays more than its fair share of a judgment, it can seek 
contribution from a co-defendant.  However, if the co-defendant is 
judgment proof, it is the first defendant, and not the plaintiff, who is 
stuck with the loss. 
Through the years in Maryland and elsewhere, trading the 
adoption of comparative fault for the abrogation of joint and several 
liability has sometimes been suggested as a possible legislative 
compromise.  Many future defendants would benefit from the 
abrogation of joint and several liability, and many plaintiffs’ attorneys 
would welcome comparative fault.  Many of the most politically 
powerful plaintiffs’ attorneys in Maryland, however, practice in areas 
such as mass products and medical malpractice litigation, where the 
continuation of joint and several liability is typically regarded as more 
important to their clients and themselves than is the abrogation of 
contributory negligence as a total bar to recovery.  Hence, the 
interests of politically powerful segments of the plaintiffs’ bar lobbyists 
sometimes deviate from that of future negligence victims who will be 
prevented from recovering because of contributory negligence. 
In addition, lobbyists representing the interests of plaintiffs’ 
attorneys may not be as effective as one might expect in the legislative 
process as proxies representing all Maryland residents who might 
unforeseeably become accident victims at any moment.  In recent 
decades, the insurance industry and business interests have fueled a 
massive public relations campaign disparaging both plaintiffs’ 
personal injury lawyers and the performance of courts in these cases.  
These campaigns have been at least somewhat effective.50  As a result, 
                                                        
 50.  See, e.g., Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The Strange Success of Tort Reform, 53 
EMORY L.J. 1225, 1236 (2004) (reporting survey research attributing the decline in auto 
accident claims rate to insurers’ intense public relations campaigns).  
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lobbyists for plaintiffs’ lawyers may no longer be as effective as proxies 
for future accident victims as they might once have been. 
D.  “Changed Conditions” 
The majority opinion in Coleman recognized that “changed 
conditions” justify a court in changing the common law.  The 
appropriate question to ask, therefore, is what conditions have 
changed since Irwin v. Sprigg,51 where the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland first adopted contributory negligence as a total bar to 
recovery, a doctrine that the court has since ritualistically reaffirmed 
as precedent .52 
The most relevant changes, of course, are those that relate to 
accidental injury.  In 1850, the population of Maryland was 583,034,53 
a significant percentage of which was slaves.  Even though the first 
railroads had begun in the preceding decades, the industrial 
revolution had yet to transform Maryland; it remained largely an 
agrarian, tobacco-growing state.  In short, Maryland had yet to 
experience what legal historian John Fabian Witt described as “the 
great waves of industrialization in the American economy [that] have 
always been . . . a central interpretative tool in explaining changes in 
the nineteenth- and twentieth-century law of torts.”54  Obviously, the 
automobile— the largest single source of negligence cases in modern-
day Maryland, once described by federal circuit court of appeals 
Judge Guido Calabresi as “an evil deity who demanded 55,000 lives 
every year in exchange for providing amazing powers of individual 
transportation”55—would not be invented for another half-century.  
Although statistics indicating the numbers of accidental injuries and 
deaths caused by negligence in Maryland in 1847 are not available, it 
is noteworthy that in 1870 only thirteen personal injury claims were 
filed in New York City, a number that would increase more than 
                                                        
 51.  6 Gill 200 (Md. 1847).  
 52.  See Harrison v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 451, 456 A.2d 894, 
898 (1983) (observing that “Maryland has steadfastly adhered to the doctrine since its 
adoption in 1847”).  
 53.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RESIDENT POPULATION AND APPORTIONMENT OF THE U.S. 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MARYLAND, available at 
http://www.census.gov/dmd/www/resapport/states/maryland.pdf  (last visited July 22, 
2013).  
 54.  John Fabian Witt, Toward a New History of American Accident Law: Classical Tort Law 
and the Cooperative Firstparty Insurance Movement, 114 HARV. L. REV. 690, 693-94(2001).  
 55.  GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES AND THE LAW: PRIVATE LAW 
PERSPECTIVES ON A PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM 1(1985). 
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thirty-fold within forty years.56  One would think that the exponential 
increase in accidental injury as a result of the proliferation of the 
automobile and other machinery would constitute “changed 
conditions.” 
Today, a very high percentage of damages resulting from 
negligence actions are paid for by liability insurance.  In the 1840s, 
except for maritime insurance, there was no liability insurance57—any 
judgment against defendants would be paid from their own pockets.  
This too would seem to be a “changed condition.” 
In modern times, Maryland courts, as well as those of other 
jurisdictions, recognize both loss minimization (deterrence) and loss 
distribution (compensation) as legitimate goals of tort law.58  
Notwithstanding (or if you prefer, legitimizing) the objections of the 
Tea Party, both loss minimization and loss distribution at the hands of 
the other branches of government dramatically increased during the 
twentieth century in ways unimaginable in 1847.  Regulation of goods 
and services by federal agencies such as the Food and Drug 
Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency, as well as 
by state agencies, are integral components of the American economic 
structure.  We spread the losses of old age and misfortune through 
governmental programs such as social security, Medicare, and 
Medicaid, as well as through private health insurance.  The integral 
involvement of governmental regulation in the American economy, in 
effect loss minimization implemented by legislatures and 
administrative agencies, and the ubiquitousness of loss distribution 
through government programs—and, to a greater or lesser extent, 
the public’s acceptance of these governmental functions—are also 
“changed conditions” since 1847. 
Under the standards the Court of Appeals of Maryland itself has 
set for overruling past precedents, the  court should have considered 
comparative fault on its merits and overturned its 1847 precedent 
establishing contributory negligence as a total bar to recovery. 
                                                        
 56.  Witt, supra note 54, at 759.  
 57.  David A. Fischer & Robert H. Jerry, II, Teaching Torts Without Insurance: A Second-
Best Solution, 45 ST. LOUIS L.J. 857, 860-61 (2001) (identifying 1886 as the date of the first 
liability insurance policy in the United States).  
 58.  See Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 343, 363 A.2d 955, 958 (1976) 
(justifying strict liability because it “shifts the risk of loss to those better able financially to 
bear the loss” and that “consumer relies upon the seller in expecting that a product is 
safe”).  
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III.  CONCLUSION 
The fact that the state’s highest common law court abdicated its 
authority and dodged its constitutionally imposed institutional 
responsibilities at this time in history is extraordinarily ironic.  No one 
would deny that Maryland’s state capital is a place infused with special 
interest lobbyists and pervaded by campaign contributions.  The 
legislature is neither the constitutionally preferred nor probably the 
best-suited branch of government to establish the principles and rules 
governing whether James Kyle Coleman and tens of thousands of 
other Maryland residents will be treated fairly when they are 
unexpectedly injured.  Public confidence in the legislative process is 
at an all-time low.59  This, however, is the process to which the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland yields when it abdicates its traditional 
functions. 
Why?  We can only speculate.  For decades now, businesses and 
insurance carriers have conducted a massive public relations 
campaign to besmirch the judicial process that governs the claims of 
accident victims.  Were the well-financed, repeated annual campaigns 
in Annapolis against legislative enactment of comparative fault so 
pervasive that they seeped through the walls of the Robert C. Murphy 
Court of Appeals Building?  A small group of business and insurance 
lobbyists makes huge fees running around each year predicting doom 
if comparative fault is adopted.  Mind you, that is not the experience 
in the forty-six other states that have adopted comparative fault, and 
there is no empirical consensus justifying the argument.60  However, 
the ritual incantation that the sky will fall if comparative fault is 
adopted contributes substantially to the lobbyists’ very healthy 
incomes.  No doubt their clients genuinely believe the 
prognostications of doom from their own “experts.”  Did the judges of 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland fear embarrassment if they adopted 
comparative fault, which at least several of the judges seem to 
personally prefer, only to have the Maryland General Assembly 
overturn that result? 
                                                        
 59.  Elizabeth Mendes & Joy Wilke, Americans’ Confidence in Congress Falls to Lowest on 
Record, GALLUP POLITICS (June 13, 2013), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/163052/americans-confidence-congress-falls-lowest-
record.aspx. 
 60.  See, e.g., Eli K. Best & John J. Donohue III, Jury Nullification in Modified Comparative 
Negligence Regimes, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 945, 974 n.92 (2012) (stating that the economic 
efficiency of contributory and comparative has been debated “with no conclusive result” 
and citing two opposing studies).  
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Or did the judges simply not understand that the deference they 
owe the legislature when a state statute is challenged on constitutional 
grounds does not apply when they are addressing a common law issue 
on which the legislature has not acted?  In all probability, the judges 
in the majority believe that their decision was a traditional and 
conservative one.  It is not.  It is a radical redefinition constraining the 
lawful authority of Maryland’s highest common law court. 
